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INTRODUCTION
Globalization has been blamed for a number of ills in the world. It
has been argued that globalization caused the increasing gap between
rich and poor, degradation of environmental resources, domestic and
international violence, and even terrorism.' Globalization has also
been credited with an equally significant number of advances in the
world. These advances include providing increased access to
education, awareness and publicity of human rights violations in all
regions of the world, and improved inter-cultural understanding.2
Regardless of one's stance on globalization, it is a concept that
cannot be ignored.
Terrorism,3 especially of late, impacts our lives routinely and took
much of the world by surprise in recent years with its effect on
political and social relations. Recent terrorist attacks have been
hailed as representative of a policy of hatred toward the West, hatred
toward capitalism, and hatred toward globalization.4 Many argue that
1. See generally Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization,
Terror and the Movements of People, 36 INTL. LAW. 91 (2002) (noting that the
links between globalization and terrorism are not fully understood, but that ana-
lysts have warned that globalization can contribute to terrorism).
2. See KOFI A. ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 9, U.N. Doc. DPU2103, U.N. Sales No. E.00.1.16 (2000)
(stating that "[t]he benefits of globalization are plain to see: faster economic
growth, higher living standards, accelerated innovation and diffusion of technology
and management skills, new economic opportunities for individuals and countries
alike."), http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/chl.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2004).
3. See REX A. HUDSON, WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST AND WHY: THE 1999
GOVERNMENT REPORT ON PROFILING TERRORISTS 17 (The Lyons Press 1999) (de-
fining the term "terrorism"). According to the terrorist profile guide published by
the U.S. Library of Congress, terrorism is defined as follows:
[u]nable to achieve their unrealistic goals by conventional means, interna-
tional terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terror-
izing the general public. Through the choice of their targets, which are often
symbolic or representative of the targeted nation, terrorists attempt to create a
high-profile impact on the public of their targeted enemy or enemies with
their act of violence, despite the limited material resources that are usually at
their disposal.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Sanam F. Vakil, The Great Leap Backward: Review of Barry
Rubin: The Tragedy of the Middle East, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 209, 209-11
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the beginnings of modem terrorism are found in poverty, religion,
and envy. And like globalization, one cannot ignore terrorism.
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 events created a new
atmosphere of fear and vengeance, imposed upon the world primarily
by the United States and Britain.6 Hidden in this fear is a severe
misunderstanding about the cause of terrorism, its remarkable ties to
globalization, and the painfully underutilized solution to eradicating
it as a means of political or social expression.
In this essay, I argue that the roots of recent forms of international
terrorism, primarily those based in the Middle East, are planted in an
impoverished and ill-nurtured soil.7 By examining the market
structure and economic development of countries where recent
terrorist activity has greatly increased, I contend that we will uncover
a region poisoned with incomplete or inadequate development,
limited employment opportunities, and infrequent interaction with
both people from other cultures and potential trading partners.8 I
suggest that much of this lack of development is caused by the
absence of real markets, and the inability to sustain trade with
commodities other than oil and, in effect, a failure to effectively
globalize. 9
(2003) (book review) (discussing recent terrorist attacks in the Middle East and the
region's disappointment with democracy and angry perceptions of an overly in-
volved United States).
5. Interview by Neal Conan with Edward Walker, President, Middle East In-
stitute (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Walker Interview] (defining the effects of a
socio-economic crisis on the growth of terrorism in the Middle East), at
http://www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2003/un/030603.barsh.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2004).
6. See Shibley Telhami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 581, 581-85 (2002) (discussing the worldwide empathy expressed to the
United States after September 1 th and the controversial U.S. attempts to combat
the "supply side" of terrorism).
7. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the roots of terrorism and economic
disparity in the Middle East).
8. See infra Part I (exploring the economic realities in the Middle East with an
emphasis on the effects of the oil market and economic under-development on the
states in the Middle East).
9. See infra Part I (describing the area's oil economy and exploring how it re-
lates to social stability).
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My approach consists of five steps. First, I identify the reasons
why most recent terrorist attacks against the West have originated in
the Middle East.10 I briefly explore the common characteristics of
terrorist recruits, including their class, opportunities and religious
beliefs, and then I discuss why these characteristics play such a
crucial role in the war on terror.I'
Second, I proffer a viable solution that the United States and many
scholars recognize, but which is surprisingly absent from
contemporary U.S. foreign policy.'2 This section concentrates on the
awareness of, and pushes for the implementation of development
programs aimed at market stabilization, judicial reform, and
employment growth as viable weapons against terrorist recruiters. 3
Specifically, I draw parallels between current approaches to fighting
terrorism, increased violence, and regional instability. 4
Third, I assess the role that investment from foreign aid agencies,
investment banks, and corporations play in restoring the Middle East
to a center of growth and enlightenment. 5 This section also examines
the role that free trade agreements and trade unions have played in
the region. 6
Fourth, I discuss the role of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), by far the most noticeable beacon of globalization and
market development. 7 This section addresses the potential role of
10. See infra Part I (explaining the current economic crisis in the Middle East
region).
11. See infra Part I.A (defining common characteristics and possible motiva-
tions of terrorist recruits).
12. See infra Part II (exploring the possible use of developmental aid as a
means of deterring terrorism).
13. See infra Part II.A (discussing the benefits of market, judicial and employ-
ment development programs in the Middle East).
14. See infra Part II.B (reporting the results of current approaches to fighting
terrorism).
15. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the issues and implications sur-
rounding investment and foreign aid in the Middle East).
16. See infra Part III.B (exploring the economic and social impact of trade
agreements in the region).
17. See discussion infra Part IV (generally describing the developmental role of
the WTO).
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such an agency in reshaping once powerful economies and the
unusual absence and antipathy of Middle Eastern actors toward
joining the world's largest international marketplace. 18
Finally, I conclude by offering a strategy for approaching the
terrorist dilemma by shifting the U.S. focus away from military
might and toward investment and market development.' 9
My argument, while not profound, suggests that the increased
involvement of the WTO, multinational corporations, international
aid agencies, non-governmental organizations, and foreign investors
focusing on the development of non-oil industries through a process
of market diversification and stabilization will improve the lives of
those living in the Middle East. I further contend that the increased
involvement of these bodies will lessen or eliminate the frequency of
terrorist attacks emanating from the region.0
I. UNCOVERING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
Terrorism is not a novel concept."1 It did not begin on September
11, 2001, nor will it end with the U.S. campaign against terror.
Terrorism is in one sense an act of political expression, which
generates grand-scale public attention to a particular group or cause.
Yet, in another sense, it is an expression of despair and desperation
for a better way of life. 2 This despair leads to terrorism in large part
because of an all too familiar word--oil. 3
18. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the membership reluctance and possible im-
pact of the WTO on the Middle East).
19. See discussion infra Part V (arguing that investment and market develop-
ment will more successfully control the growth of terrorism in the Middle East).
20. See infra Part I-V (discussing the inverse effect that economic development
would impose on the growth of terrorism in the Middle East).
21. See generally Sharon Harzenski, Terrorism, A History: Stage One, 12 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 137 (2003) (providing a history of terrorism beginning
with the French Revolution).
22. See Vakil, supra note 4, at 209 (arguing that socio-economic difficulties in
the Middle East are the foundations of terrorism in the region).
23. See id. at 211 (addressing the disparaging effect the oil market had on the
development of Middle Eastern countries).
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The Middle East was not a haven to terrorists prior to its discovery
of oil in the early twentieth century. It was at this moment that their
national economies shifted from diverse agricultural and textile
markets to single-commodity exporters.24 The dependency on oil as a
primary export grew rapidly, as did the wealth accumulated by the
grand kingdoms of oil moguls. Those who could not enlist in the
black gold industry were quickly sifted out and left with minimal
opportunity for their own development. This led to the current
economic crisis in the region, marked by severe unemployment and
little or no opportunity for the development of competitive and
sustainable industries other than oil, an industry that in itself is losing
significant ground.25
The result was a society unable to modernize, unable to grow, and
unable to join the world market. Citizens were left with little
opportunity to earn a living and developing significant anger toward
those profiting from the otherwise expanding global market. Edward
Walker from the Middle East Institute recently said:
When you've got unemployment rates running around [twenty] percent in
many of the Arab countries, it means that young people who are
graduating from universities can't get jobs, and in that society, it means
they can't get married. It means they're frustrated, and it tends to lead to
radicalization of the younger people in these countries. Some of them, at
least, in that context, will turn to terrorism. So economic stability,
economic opportunity is part and parcel-has got to be a part and parcel
of the war on terrorism.
26
24. See generally Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook." Saudi
Arabia (2002) [hereinafter World Factbook] (stating that in Saudi Arabia, "in the
1930's, the discovery of oil transformed the country."), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2004).
25. See, e.g., Vakil, supra note 4, at 211 (indicating that "[f]or a time, oil reve-
nues were able to mask economic mismanagement and fiscal profligacy. But with
the decline of oil revenues in the early 1980s came the glaring reality of regional
disparity highlighted by the lack of economic development."). See generally
NASA Ctr. for Educ. Technologies, Economic Growth and Decline [hereinafter
Economic Growth] (showing the deleterious effects of a growing population and a
shrinking export price for oil), at http://www.cet.edu/earthinfo/meast/MEeco.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
26. See Walker Interview, supra note 5 (identifying that unemployment fosters
the participation in terrorism).
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Therein lays the problem. The discovery of oil led to a single-
commodity industry for many countries in the Middle East.27 This
has prevented the development of a diverse array of industries that
would allow these countries to be sustainable and competitive in the
global marketplace and to enjoy more opportunity for growth in their
home markets.28 The reliance on oil as a primary export has left these
budding economies to the whims of the fluctuating oil markets,
which rise and fall with little predictability. 9 Those left without
access to wealth or opportunity are left jobless, desperate, and
susceptible to terrorist recruitment. 0
II. DISPARITIES OF WEALTH AND POLITICS
WITHIN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Acts of terror throughout Lebanon, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia are
increasing in frequency. 3' And, while each terrorist group has its own
27. See Interview by Neal Conan with Charlene Barshefsky, Former U.S.
Trade Representative (June 3, 2003) ("This is a very fragmented region. It is
largely isolated from the global economy, despite oil, or to put it another way, oil
is the only connection between the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Middle
East, and the global economy."), at
www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2003/jun/030603.barsh.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2004).
28. See id. (explaining the limited market opportunities available in the Middle
East).
29. See Economic Growth, supra note 25, at 2 (finding that the discovery of oil
wealth created disparity within both producing and non-producing Middle Eastern
countries).
30. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 3, at 77 (suggesting that while many terrorist
groups find their recruits among middle-class professionals, Islamic terrorist or-
ganizations tend to "include substantial numbers of poor people, many of them
homeless refugees"). I do not support the idea that poverty alone creates potential
terrorists, which in effect would multiply the battleground in the war on terror ten-
fold or more. See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (Sept. 2002) (quoting President Bush's contention that "[p]overty does
not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions,
and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks ... within
their borders."), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004).
31. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential:
September 11 and the Insurance Industry, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 687, 697-98 (2003)
(discussing the series of attacks by al Qaeda since 1993 and the increase in casual-
ties beginning with the September 1 th, 2001 attacks).
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method of achieving its goals, each shares the common recruitment
practice of seeking members from poor areas who have limited
opportunities to support themselves.32 Poverty is rampant in rank and
file Muslim terrorists; however, it is not found in the leadership of
these groups.33 So while the large majority of members of terrorist
groups hail from impoverished areas in the Middle East and Southern
Asia that do not afford sufficient opportunities for members' self
sufficiency,34 the wealthy leadership continue to belong "to an old
tradition in which self-serving elites seize upon and manipulate the
grievances of the poor."35 By manipulating ideas and subsequently
the minds of individuals, these power-hungry leaders are able to
seize upon the lack of opportunity of these often impoverished and
otherwise peaceful citizens, convincing them to rise up and take the
lives of others and/or themselves in the name of the leadership's
cause-not Islam, but vengeance.3 6
The members of these groups are not natural-born terrorists. They
were born into societies with little opportunity and no chance of
making a better life for themselves.37 Intertwined with these
32. See Hudson, supra note 3, at 76-77 (explaining the recruiting practices of
many terrorist organizations).
33. Osama bin Laden received over $300 million from an inheritance and has
acted as a successful businessman by working with groups seeking political or so-
cial influence. See Hudson, supra note 3 (finding that only the leadership of Arab
terrorist organizations hail from the middle and upper classes).
34. See Telhami, supra note 6, at 587 (indicating that "[tlo succeed, terror or-
ganizers, regardless of their aims, need to recruit willing members, raise funds, and
appeal to public opinion in pursuit of their political objectives. Public despair and
humiliation are often fertile ground for terror organizers to exploit. If this demand
side persists, the terrorism phenomenon is unlikely to be contained.")
35. KEN BOOTH & TIM DUNNE, Worlds in Collision, in WORLDS IN COLLISION:
TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 9 (Ken Booth & Tim Dunne eds.,
2002).
36. See Telhami, supra note 6, at 587 (suggesting that terrorist leaders such as
Osama bin Laden do not use their personal goals to recruit new members, but
rather highlight the "issues that resonate with the public and that explain more
fully the sense of despair and humiliation among Arabs and Muslims: the Arab-
Israeli issue and sanctions against Iraq.").
37. See, e.g., Walker Interview, supra note 5 (explaining that the "gap has actu-
ally increased in the region between the rich and the poor. I do believe that there is
a link, although not a direct one, between poverty and terrorism. Most of the terror-
ists are not impoverished. Most of them are frustrated, people who come from the
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economic circumstances is an Islamic belief structure that advocates
living a just and moral life.38 Unfortunately for the victims of
terrorist attacks, the writings of Islam do not specify with
particularity the acceptable practices of a moral life.39
Islam is not a violent religion, nor does it in any way encourage
the use of violence to achieve personal goals.40 It does not preach
mass destruction of any group of people, nor does it allow for
violence as a form of political expression.4" Instead, it instructs on
the peaceful coexistence of different societies and the internal
struggle for peace.42 "According to the Quran, [the] taking of one life
is like the killing of all humankind. ' 43 Islam serves as a guiding path
for impoverished citizens, offering them hope that if they succeed in
middle class and have some education. So it's not exactly a direct link, it's more a
question of whether jobs are available and whether people can feel good about
themselves.").
38. See United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 82: Islamic Perspec-
tives on Peace and Violence, at 3 [hereinafter Islamic Perspectives) (listing many
Muslim beliefs such as having a "duty to pursue justice," of "doing good," and of
leading "sacred lives"), at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr82.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004).
39. See id. at 1 (proffering that while Islam "does not teach Muslims to kill in-
nocent people in the name of a political agenda" its teachings are often distorted to
meet the desires of fundamentalists).
40. See id. (explaining that "Islam advocates numerous nonviolent and peace-
building values and expects Muslims to live by them.").
41. See id. (contending that it is a distortion of Islam to claim justification for
killing in the name of a religion that teaches peace).
42. See Libya Affirms its Stance Against Terrorism, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, June 7, 2003 (reporting the Libyan General People's Congress noted
that "Islam is a great religion that rejects violence, calls for love and peace and ac-
cepts dialogue between religions, civilizations and cultures."); see also Islamic
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Dr. Abdulaziz Othman Altwai-
jri, Director General of ISESCO, The Sources of Arab Culture, Its Components
and Characteristics (stating that "[t]he Arab-Islamic culture, which originally
stems from the Qur'an and the Sunna, is a broad-minded culture which preaches
coexistence, dialogue and understanding."), at
http://www.isesco.org.ma/pub/Eng/Arabiculture/page2.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
43. See Islamic Perspectives, supra note 38, at 1 (contending that it is a distor-
tion of Islam to claim justification for killing as a religion that teaches peace in-
stead of violence).
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living a life based on the tenets taught by Islamic leaders, they will
be rewarded after death.4
As in any impoverished, religiously-devout society, many
followers of Islam in the Middle East are subject to manipulation
through the teachings of influential and powerful leaders that often
tout themselves as inspired by God.45 These leaders provide the
primary source of education for a large portion of the population. For
instance, only fifty-seven percent of the people in Saudi Arabia are
able to attend primary school, 46 while one-hundred percent follow the
tenets of Islam.47
These statistics show the significant potential for the
misrepresentation of Islamic law to further political or personal
goals. Religious authority figures could easily manipulate young,
uneducated citizens into believing that their cause is righteous and
that it will affirm their belief in Allah.48 This is most evident in the
stated goals of the al Qaeda organization:
Initially, al Qaeda seeks to establish a pan-Islamic religious movement for
the promotion of its political aims. This pan-Islamic movement seeks to
unify Muslims through the provision of social and educational services.
44. Qur'an, Al-Sajadah 32:17, at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/032.qmt.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
45. See, e.g., Skidmore College, Introduction to Islam and Women in Islamic
Cultures (explaining that Imams among the Shi'a Muslims are thought to be "di-
vinely inspired and infallible"), at
http://www.skidmore.edu/academics/arthistory/ah369/intro.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2004).
46. See UNESCO Statistics Division, Education Enrollment Ratio, Net, Pri-
mary Level, Both Sexes (2000) (showing a less than fifty-eight percent rate for
Saudi Arabia as compared to a more than ninety-six percent rate for the Palestinian
territories), at
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi-seriesresults.asp?rowlD=589&flD
=r1 5&cgID (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
47. See World Factbook, supra note 24 (providing that Islam is the sole relig-
ion in Saudi Arabia with a one-hundred percent following made up of various eth-
nic groups, and noting that the Saudi Arabian legal system is based on Islamic
law).
48. See ROLAND JACQUARD, IN THE NAME OF OSAMA BIN LADEN: GLOBAL
TERRORISM & THE BIN LADEN BROTHERHOOD 101 (Duke Univ. Press 2002)
(learning in an interview with Mohammed Atef that America is weak in battle
against Islamic martyrs, the author suggests that "for the fundamentalists, [martyr-
dom] was earning visas to paradise.").
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Second, al Qaeda seeks to expel Westerners and non-Muslims from
traditional Muslim areas, including Saudi Arabia and the states bordering
the Persian Gulf. The third principle is the expulsion of Muslim leaders
deemed to have deviated from fundamental tenets of Islam, such as the
Fahd dynasty in Saudi Arabia and the regime of Pervez Musharraf in
Pakistan. A fourth principle of the organization is revenge for the
perceived historical mistreatment of Muslims throughout the world.
Finally, and most ambitiously, al Qaeda desires the establishment of a
religious state throughout the Islamic world by restoration of the
caliphate.49
The al Qaeda example demonstrates how terrorists manipulate
religious ideology to achieve their goals.
III. FIGHTING THE RIGHT WAR: ATTACKING
POVERTY INSTEAD OF PEOPLE
A. THE POVERTY APPROACH
In his final speech in the United Kingdom as President of the
United States, Bill Clinton stressed: "we have seen how abject
poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and
those who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a
violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our
future depends."5 His words carried more significance than he could
have known at that moment.51
The terrorist networks that have come about in recent history are a
significant threat to world security not only because of the suicidal
methods they employ, but also because of the status of the countries
49. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 697-98 (2003) (outlining the goals of the al
Qaeda movement).
50. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at the Dimbleby Lecture
(Dec. 14, 2001) [hereinafter The Dimbleby Lecture] (describing what forces
contributed to terrorism before the events of September 11, 2001 in the United
States), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arts/news-comment/dimbleby/clinton2.shtml (last visited
Jan12 28e0 g. CINDY C. COMBS, TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 66
(3d ed. 2003) ("The poverty and hunger in the developing nations threaten social
and political stability, while providing fertile ground for those who want to blame
the Western governments for these conditions.").
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where these networks recruit new members, engage in training
exercises and where the leadership seeks refuge. These countries are
not equipped politically or economically to design proactive plans to
uproot such organizations in their own countries, despite their
expressed efforts to do so.52 They are developing countries with
weak, or no, democratic political structure with which to coordinate
such efforts. They do not have the resources that European countries,
for instance, have in place to take preventative measures in order to
sustain peace. 3
The George W. Bush Administration indicated that it "is aware of
the link between desperate economic circumstances and terrorism.""
Yet, rather than working to develop sustainable economies capable
of both directly (through increased political pressure and rule of law
programs) and indirectly (through increased employment
opportunities and social stability) eradicating terrorism, President
Bush has chosen to dedicate significant resources to a military
conquest against the elusive concept of terrorism itself.55 Many
Americans and, to a much lesser extent, other Western citizens,
support the view that terrorism can be fought with tanks and
52. See, e.g., U.S. State Dep't Int'l Info. Programs, Rice Welcomes Arab
Leader Agreement to Curb Terrorist Financing (June 4, 2003) (reporting on Presi-
dent Bush's attempts to help Arab leaders organize and increase their commit-
ments and communications on combating terrorism in the Middle East), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/potus/texts2003/O30604rice.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2004).
53. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World,
25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 273, 299 (2002) (exploring the problems faced by
developing countries with regard to containing terrorism).
54. See Hale E. Sheppard, Revamping the Export-Import Bank 12002: The Im-
pact of This Interim Solution on the United States and Latin America, 6 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 121 (2002-2003) (describing the Bush Administration's
efforts to eliminate the breeding grounds for terrorism in Latin America's impover-
ished areas).
55. But see Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A35 (suggesting that the Bush Administration has not ignored
the value of trade in fighting war against terrorism). U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick argued, just nine days after the September 11 th events, the need
for the U.S. to promote trade, a value at the heart of the conflict. Id.
[19:587
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bombs. 56 They obstinately believe that military technology is capable
of uncovering each potentially threatening terrorist cell and keeping
the West safe." This conventional method of warfare, while effective
in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be useless in
eliminating the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are non-
conventional actors using non-conventional means through
amorphous concepts that cannot be identified, contained, or labeled.
These are actors whose most potent weapon is the communication of
ideas among masses of people awaiting an opportunity for a better
life. Many of us watch in excited anticipation for Osama bin Laden's
capture and/or death. However, we should rest assured that whether
he is still alive will have no bearing on the control that his ideas, and
the ideas of those like him, have on the impoverished and desperate
in the Middle East, South Asia, and perhaps beyond. No military
technology will be able to destroy the prevalence and furtherance of
those ideas. 8
A Washington, D.C. lawyer recently made a connection between
terrorism and the role that a government plays in fighting poverty
among its own people. He stated, "[i]f governments.., fail to
counteract [despondency resulting from poverty and oppression] by
meeting the basic needs of their people, then these areas will become
'havens for terror.'" 59 Because of its exceedingly high unemployment
rate, evaporating gross domestic product growth, and lack of free
markets and stable financial institutions, the Middle East is a prime
56. See Courtland Milloy, War Hawks Blinded By Hardened Hearts, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2003, at BI (commenting on Americans' support for the war on
Iraq and the dominance of "war hawks" in the current political environment).
57. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad
vs. McWorld, in WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL
ORDER, supra note 35, at 245, 246-47 ("Eliminating terrorists will depend on pro-
fessional military intelligence and diplomatic resources whose deployment will
leave the greater number of citizens in the [United States] and throughout the
world sitting on the sidelines.").
58. See Colum Lynch, Musharraf Criticizes Terror War: Pakistani President
Says Muslims Are Feeling Targeted, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A12 (quoting
statements from various global leaders that military force is ineffective against ter-
rorism). U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that in "the fight against terror-
ism, ideas matter" and that we "delude ourselves if we think military force alone
can defeat terrorism." Id.
59. Sheppard, supra note 54, at 121.
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target for terrorist recruiters.60 Countries of the Middle East, with the
help of Western states, must take action to promote market reform,
develop political transparency, and create jobs in multiple sectors of
the regional economy.
The impact of additional terrorist cells emerging around the world
will significantly damage the nation-state regime that has been in
place for almost 400 years.61 What some consider to be "local
terrorist groups" have brought about reform in some facet of their
government institutions through representation in legislative bodies
or public attention to and subsequent adjustment of negative
government policies.62 However, international terrorist groups like
those we have seen in recent months are seeking government
coalescence in their efforts rather than government reform.63
Developing nations' governments are often weak and unable to
protect their citizens, much less initiate measures to prevent the
development of terrorist groups from arising within their borders.64
60. See Edward Gardner, International Monetary Fund, Creating Employment
in the Middle East and North Africa (2003) (contending that the high unemploy-
ment and decreasing growth in the region are the "most urgent and destabilizing
problems, fueling social tensions, encouraging migration, and making job creating
a top priority"), at http://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/gardner/
(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
61. See Philip M. Taylor, Credibility Can 't Win Hearts and Minds Without It,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2003, at B2 (suggesting that the United States' military in-
tervention in Iraq and its fight against terrorism has changed the basic principle of
non-interference in other countries' politics that was established by the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648).
62. See Margarita Gonzalez de Pazos, Indigenous Renascence: Law, Culture
and Society in the 21st Century: Mexico Since the Mayan Uprising: Government
and Zapatista Uprisings, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 159, 165 (1997) (describing the
Accord between the Zapatistas of Mexico and the Mexican government that
granted them representation rights).
63. See DILIP HIRO, WAR WITHOUT END: THE RISE OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM
AND GLOBAL RESPONSE 397 (Routledge 2002) (describing the various violent and
non-violent tactics of terrorist leaders seeking to persuade their followers to ensure
the support of their host states). Some of these leaders present Islam "as a religion
of justice and equity and decry the current ruling elite as unjust, un-Islamic and
corrupt, deserving to be overthrown, or at the very least replaced non-violently by
true believers." Id.
64. See Paul Blustein, Commitment to World's Poor Nations Is Reaffirmed;
Rebuilding of Iraq Is Not To Shift Global Aid Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2003, at
A26 (reporting the World Bank data concerning poverty, health, and education in-
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The weakest regimes in developing countries will collapse
completely and only independent factions will remain to claim power
over the people, resulting in a situation similar to the superficial
peace created in Iraq in early 2003:
Peace is turning out to be hell for average Iraqis. Electricity is still out in
many parts of Baghdad. Looting is rampant, as thieves fill trucks with
everything from scrap wood to crates of weapons. The threat of
carjacking and kidnapping keeps people locked inside their houses.
Drinking water is dicey. Many can't return to work, while children can't
attend school. Skirmishes are breaking out among Kurdish and Arab
rivals in the oil-rich north. In the south, the long-repressed Shiite majority
is flexing its muscles amid growing concern about Iranian interference.
65
If weak regimes in developing countries are not strengthened, it is
likely that chaos will befall each Middle Eastern and South Asian
country when the international "crackdown" on terrorism comes
upon them. This is partly because of the resulting backlash from
targeted groups and is another unacceptable side effect of using
conventional means of warfare to combat terrorism.
The U.S. "war on terrorism" 66 is an attempt to combat an ideology
created by intense poverty and mis-education with the swift
application of violent military force and political palliatives. 67 This
strategy will be ineffective in achieving its vast goals. "When people
are embittered and brutalized and prepared to throw away their lives,
nothing we do to them will terrorize and deter them. '68 Our efforts to
dicators in many developing countries, and describing the shortage of international
funds to address these issues).
65. Stan Crock, How the U.S. Can Keep Iraq from Unraveling, Bus. WK., June
2, 2003, at 28.
66. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Why Unity Is Essential, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
2003, at A29 (arguing that the Bush Administration's definition of the war against
terrorism as a fight against "evildoers who hate freedom," is excessively theologi-
cal and has isolated the United States internationally).
67. See Telhami, supra note 6, at 586 (stating that "[b]y regarding terrorism as
the product of organized groups that could be confronted and destroyed, without
regard to their aims or to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing
members, the United States pursued a 'supply-side' only approach.")
68. See Bhikhu Parekh, Terrorism or Intercultural Dialogue, in WORLDS IN
COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 35, at 270,
271 (Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, eds., 2002) (arguing for the use of dialogue in
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fight terrorists with traditional weapons will go a long way in
eliminating rank and file members of some of these groups, and in
some instances may even strike at their leadership. But in no way do
targeted killings or bombing campaigns have any noticeable effect
on the root causes of terrorism. In fact, these efforts are likely to
stimulate increased retaliation and hatred for the West to the extent
that they are seen as attacks on Islam.69 Instead, we should
implement a comprehensive development program that addresses
legal, social, and economic concerns. 70 The 1999 U.S. government
profile on terrorists noted this point, but it is has been largely ignored
in post-September 11 th agendas.7'
Economic sanctions are another method utilized in addressing the
rise of terrorism in the Middle East. The concept in itself seems
counterintuitive in that it is often foreign economic sanctions or
domestic economic failures that contribute to the popular support of
alternative means to achieve liberation. 72 But politicians persist that
sanctions continue to generate support and should be considered as
an option to confront terrorism. The U.S. State Department stated in
1986 that "[i]n addition to their potential economic effect on the
target country, sanctions can send a powerful non-military signal that
the United States will take measures to exact costs from states that
combating terrorism, and stating that "if terrorism is reprehensible, anti-terrorist
terrorism is no better").
69. See Lynch, supra note 58, at A12 (quoting Pakistani President Musharrafs
statement that the "U.S.-led war against terrorism" has crystallized the perception
that "Islam as a religion is being targeted and pilloried.").
70. See, e.g., Brink Lindsey, The Trade Front: Combating Terrorism with
Open Markets, 24 TRADE POL'Y ANALYSIS 5 (2003) (arguing that the United States
is missing an important opportunity to win the war on terror by pursuing a broader
trade strategy), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-024es.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2004).
71. See Hudson, supra note 3, at 103 (indicating that "[r]ather than retaliate
against terrorists with bombs or cruise missiles, legal, political, diplomatic, finan-
cial, and psychological warfare measures may be more effective.")
72. See, e.g., Joseph Bradica, Havana Club Rum: One Step Back for U.S. In-
ternational Trademark Policy, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 147, 172 (2002) (ex-
plaining that the United States did not ease its sanctions against Cuba until the eco-
nomic conditions in Cuba became too extreme to ignore).
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support terrorism. 7 3 But the State Department also advised in the
same bulletin that "blanket prohibitions" on trade would disrupt U.S.
business interests, and urged the U.S. Senate to be cautious about the
effect that sanctions would have on our allies' commerce.74
Economic sanctions have a significant impact on the economy of a
developing country. 75 However, the negative effects of increased
unemployment, a constrained ability to export goods, and the
inability to receive significant international development aid are most
often felt by the populace rather than the intended governmental
targets. The result is a population left struggling to make a suitable
living under the regime of a bitter and powerless government. These
regimes are often supported by the funding of extremist groups.76 As
such, there is no motivation to discourage the teachings of Islamic
fundamentalists nor to prevent them from recruiting vulnerable
members into their cadres.
73. See U.S. Dep't of State Bulletin, Economic Sanctions to Combat Interna-
tional Terrorism, Oct. 1986, at 27 (responding to a request from Senator Lugar to
conduct an analysis of the use of economic sanctions to fight terrorism).
74. See id. (stating that "[legislation which would tie our hands by mandating
blanket prohibitions on trade could potentially harm U.S. business and our rela-
tions with our allies without imposing any significant costs on the target coun-
try.").
75. Sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, and Libya have resulted in severe negative
effects on impoverished communities. See, e.g., Bradica, supra note 72, at 172 (in-
dicating that "[u]ntil the recent release of medicine and food from the U.S. to
Cuba, the U.S. legislature had turned a blind eye to the poverty and dangerous liv-
ing conditions caused by the U.S. Embargo."); see also Don Henshaw, Sanctions
Another Weapon of War, CAMBRIDGE REP., Apr. 25, 2003, at A6 (speaking about
the 500,000 children killed as a result of economic sanctions against Iraq, the au-
thor claims that "[bly now we should all realize that sanctions never did anyone
any good whatsoever: like tax cuts and warfare, sanctions further empower the al-
ready powerful and further impoverish the already poor."); Fred Halliday, Libya
Undermines the Myth of the Special Relationship: Britain and Europe Believe
There are Benefits Derived from Having Direct Diplomatic Links, INDEP.
(LONDON), July 9, 1999, at 4 (finding that "a decade of sanctions has left Libya's
public and private sectors impoverished, and its people demoralised.").
76. See Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda's Finances Ample, Say Probes; Worldwide
Failure to Enforce Sanctions Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at A01 (noting
that al Qaeda, who sponsored the Taliban government in Afghanistan, continues to
have ample funding resources).
2004] 603
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
B. EMPLOYING THE BEST WEAPON FOR THE TASK
Much to the dismay of the campaigners against terror, terrorists
have an unlimited arsenal of weapons to use against those they desire
to harm. One of the features that set terrorist attacks apart from
traditional warfare is the common resort to creative, inexpensive and
often unexpected means of attack, such as via airplane missiles,
subway gassings, or boat bombs.77 Conversely, those confronted by
terrorism have a limited arsenal to protect against these attacks.78
They must rely on technology and intelligence that has worked in
past military confrontations, which often results in significant
destruction, yet enjoys surprisingly little success in achieving its
broader goals in the war on terrorism. As recent events have shown,
the methods employed by the terrorists and the West will make for a
modem day David and Goliath showdown.
However, there are other, potentially more successful means of
protecting ourselves against terrorism, and even preventing it before
it begins. These alternative means take a great deal of time and effort
and require patience in securing an outcome. There is no quick-fix
for this long-incubated explosion of violence, and the process must
be approached with caution as it involves the coordination of
political, economic and social change. For example, as will be
discussed more thoroughly later in this essay, the United States
Middle East Free Trade Area ("MEFTA") is scheduled to be
developed within the next decade and will contribute significantly to
this change.7 9
Attacking the root causes of terrorism is an often discussed but a
seldom practiced concept. Addressing the problem would require
77. See Paul Rogers, Political Violence and Global Order, in WORLDS IN
COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 35, at 215,
218-19 (detailing instances of unexpected terrorist attacks including the 1995 To-
kyo subway gassing and the USS Cole bombing).
78. See id. at 223 (emphasizing that the September 11 th attacks demonstrated
the "vulnerability of highly developed states to asymmetric paramilitary action").
79. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bush Calls for U.S.-Middle East Free Trade Area,
May 9, 2003 [hereinafter Call for Free Trade] (citing President Bush's com-
mencement address at the University of South Carolina in which he proposed the
establishment of a United States-Middle East free trade area within a decade), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/text2003/O509bushfta.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2004).
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extensive diplomatic efforts, long-term economic growth plans, 0 and
significant social and cultural adjustments for both Easterners and
Westerners.8' News articles and organizational efforts to influence
politics toward an agenda of prevention by attacking root causes
rather than surface-level targets are prevalent.82 However, despite
U.S. efforts to vocalize the problem, the pressure to develop reform
and seek long-term solutions is largely coming from the international
arena outside the United States.
83
The present terrorist threat is alarming, not just because it has
awakened Americans to the fact that they are vulnerable to such
violence, but also because it has awakened the international
community to the fact that terrorism has a significant effect on
financial markets and exposes a country's underlying decay in
development.84 Initially, this sounds like a subtle or collateral
statement in the context of terrorism, but it may pose more of a threat
80. See Rogers, supra note 77, at 223 (contending that long-term economic de-
velopment programs are necessary to fight terrorism, which "requires radical
changes to policies on the debt crisis, the promotion of trade reforms specifically
linked to the trading prospects of the South and the encouragement of economic
cooperation for gendered and sustainable development").
81. See CHARLES DERBER, PEOPLE BEFORE PROFIT 8 (2002) (suggesting that
global democracy building and reform through globalization needs to be viewed
"as a long-term evolving process rather than a magic bullet").
82. See, e.g., Shada Islam, US-EU Rifton Iraq: A Matter of Principle, Bus.
TIMES (SINGAPORE), Feb. 18, 2003 (describing international interest in addressing
the root causes of terrorism through multilateral action), 1003 WL 2350705;
Rosemary Righter, Beware the Chancellor's 'New Global Order,' TIMES
(LONDON), Feb. 4, 2003, at 27 (reporting on British Chancellor Gordon Brown's
anti-poverty drive to help the world's poor in an effort to prevent terrorism), 2003
WL 3101503.
83. See Betsy Pisik, Powell Promises Battle on Poverty; Tells Economic Fo-
rum Fight Will be Front of Terror War, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at Al (quot-
ing Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the World Economic Forum on
Feb. 1, 2002, "[w]e have to go after poverty. We have to go after despair. We have
to go after hopelessness"). At the same forum, Philippine President Gloria Maca-
pagal-Arroyo directly linked terrorism to poverty when she called poverty the
"handmaiden of terrorism." Id.
84. See Fred Halliday, A New Global Configuration, in WORLDS IN COLLISION:
TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 35, at 235, 237-39 (ex-
plaining a post-September 11 th shift in perceptions about globalization). The au-
thor predicts that "institutions of global financial and macroeconomic management
will now be put to the test and given greater political support." Id. at 239.
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than an act of terrorism alone. The threat of terrorism has the
potential to disrupt the careful balance of power currently in
existence, and could create significant global instability, leading to
increased violence. 85
Speaking with regard to the passage of the Export-Import Bank
Reauthorization Act of 2001, U.S. Representative J.C. Watts from
Oklahoma said that "we must reach out to developing nations across
the globe, often beset by forces of terror, and demonstrate how free
markets, open trade, and private enterprise under the rule of law can
lead to prosperity for their citizens. Our national security improves
when global stability prevails."86 The Act was passed with new
guidelines stipulating that, when determining project viability for
financing, the Bank can take into consideration the cooperation of
the host government in the fight against terrorism. 87
Policies such as this are directed at one of the root causes of
terrorism-the failure of market 'development.88 By linking
international development projects to the prevention of terrorism, the
Export-Import Bank is effectively establishing a blueprint for the
minimum threshold of stability prior to its engagement in projects
within any country. Indeed, the Bank is well-aware of the need for
some minimal level of stability if a project is to secure foreign
investment, even from high-risk investors.8 9
However, this conditional support prevents the benefits of
globalization and development through projects such as this from
reaching the people who need it most. The most appropriate time for
85. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 54, at 122 (noting that our national security
is dependent upon the prevalence of a stable global environment).
86. See 148 CONG. REc. H1773, at H1785 (daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement
of Rep. Watts).
87. See Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
189, 116 Stat. 698 (June 14, 2002) (enabling the Export-Import Bank to consider
foreign countries' assistance to the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism).
88. See Halliday, supra note 84, at 238 (arguing that an important result of the
September 11 th attacks is a shift away from a "neo-liberal firth in the market" back
to "the management of the world economy").
89. See DERBER, supra note 81, at 6 ("Globalization demands a world of open
borders, where goods and services, people, and money are easily and safely ex-
changed. Closed borders, anthrax anxiety, and fear of flying or foreigners signal
the end of globalization as we know it").
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the World Bank and similar institutions to begin a development
project is when terror recruiters are lurking in neighborhoods,
searching for new recruits. These projects should be locally-staffed,
sponsored by the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and supported by a
coalition of global financiers. Then the choice for these would-be
terrorists would be to lash out at their oppressors by becoming a
martyr, or to engage in productive work that will feed their family
and provide a future for their community.90 Of course the concern
remains that increased democratization and market development in
these high-risk developing countries could fuel the hatred of Western
ideas.9' Past projects demonstrate that local communities must lead
in the first steps at market development, and that by advisement and
support, rather than hostility and competition multilateral institutions
must guide those local communities. 92 The Reauthorization Act
offers hope because it identifies the strong link between trade and
terrorism, but it must go further and recognize that trade is a weapon
against terrorism, not merely a reward for its prevention.93
90. See id. at 10 (arguing that globalization cannot avoid situations in which
democracy and stability are not apparent).
91. See id. at 12 (noting that individuals in many countries perceive globaliza-
tion as a "loss of choice" and believe that their own governments abandon them to
become "servants of an American-backed leviathan.").
92. See Exp. -Imp. Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Signs Agreement to
Support Trade Bank of Iraq (providing that the U.S. Export-Import Bank recently
signed an agreement to support the funding of the trade bank of Iraq, offering them
the support they need without direct involvement), at
http://www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfin/47CA2AAE-EAF4-AA78-
4655879789C765F2/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
93. See Congressman John LaFalce, Address at the Ex-Im Annual Conference
(May 2, 2002) (claiming that the terrorist attacks on September 11 th emphasized
the importance of economic -engagement with the rest of the world and stating that
"top-level diplomacy will ultimately fail if it is not supported by bottom-up en-
gagement in the political, the social, and the economic spheres."), at
http://www.exim.gov/news/speeches/may0202.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
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IV. STRIKING AT THE TERRORIST TARGETS
WITH AID AND TRADE
A. AID AGENCIES AT THE FRONT LINES
Poverty in regions where terrorism spawns is not a novel concept,
nor is it one that has not been addressed by multilateral,
governmental, and non-governmental organizations, such as the
United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"), the
World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency
("CIDA").94 Organizations like these have been addressing poverty
since their inception, long before the tragedy that befell the United
States on September 11 th. In many instances, these organizations
remain the last ones to leave a country heading toward or enveloped
in a conflict.95
Terrorist acts are not a central focus of the work of these agencies
in part because such acts rarely create large-scale humanitarian
disasters.96 It is important to point out that "the 3,000 who died in
New York [on September 1 Ith] were less than half the number of
children who die from diarrhoea [sic] (caused by the lack of a clean
94. See U.S. Dep't of State, USAID Strives to Minimizes [sic] Conditions That
Foster Terrorism, Mar. 26, 2003 [hereinafter USAID Strives to Minimize] (report-
ing that USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Gordon West stated, "[t]he U.S.
National Security Strategy identifies development assistance as one of the three
pillars necessary to assure our national security, [and USAID] plays a major role in
minimizing the conditions that foster terrorism, instability and other global
threats."), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03032622.htm (last visited
Jan. 16, 2004).
95. See, e.g., Interview by Abderrahim Foukara with Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General, United Nations (Apr. 2, 2003) (noting that the United Nations stayed in
Baghdad later than any other agency as the war in Iraq took hold, but ultimately
withdrew to ensure security of personnel), at
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=407 (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
96. See Edward C. Luck, Discussion Paper for the Roundtable on Protection,
Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism 8 (stating that "[t]he scale of most terrorist at-
tacks, at least until the destruction of the World Trade Center, had been relatively
modest compared to major humanitarian disasters."), available at
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/cio/cio/projects/OCHALuckppr.pdf (last visited Jan.
22, 2004).
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water supply) somewhere in the world every day."97 But aid agencies
are unwittingly at the front lines of the war on terror, 9 and by
addressing problems like poverty, access to clean water, disease, and
starvation, these agencies attack the root causes of terrorism without
firing a shot. 99
Eradicating poverty is the single most potent solution to the
problem of terrorism. 100 Reducing poverty improves health, and thus
the sanctity of life; it permits access to education, and thus the ability
to learn new skills and about the co-existence of cultures; it generates
freedom; it spurs democracy; and it creates new opportunities for
growth. 10' A reduction in poverty levels allows for stable democratic
regimes to emerge, leading in time to the implementation of the rule
97. See Never Forget the Other Terror, NEW STATESMAN (London), Nov. 5,
2001, at 6 (emphasizing the need for humanitarian agencies to focus their efforts
and resources on larger humanitarian disasters and that the underprivileged people
with whom they work "with empty stomachs and dying children do not immedi-
ately see that a world ruled by Bushes and Blairs would be superior to one ruled by
the likes of Bin Laden."),
http://www.findarticles.com/cf dls/mOFQP/4562 130/80023098/p 1/article.jhtml
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
98. See Catherine Philp, On the Front Line ofAmerica's Forgotten War, TIMES
ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2003 (describing the danger to the aid organizations in Afghani-
stan: "[t]here are almost daily attacks not only on American soldiers and their Af-
ghan allies, but also on foreign aid agencies and civilians."), at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,5461-576490,00.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
99. See USAID Strives to Minimize, supra note 94 (reporting that USAID Dep-
uty Assistant Administrator Gordon West found conditions such as poverty, dis-
ease, unemployment, and corruption provide "fertile breeding grounds for terror-
ists," thereby creating an environment where individuals are lured into terrorist
groups).
100. See Telhami, supra note 6, at 587 (emphasizing that as both the Arab-
Israeli issue and sanctions against Iraq contribute to this sense of despair and hu-
miliation "[p]ublic despair and humiliation are often fertile ground for terror or-
ganizers to exploit.").
101. See John Langmore, A Callous Snub to the World's Poor, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, June 27, 2000, at 15 (reporting that member states of the
United Nations agreed to adopt a global goal to reduce the proportion of individu-
als living in extreme poverty by 2015 and that the principal manner in which to
achieve this is to "empower the poor" through the availability of education, health
services, and credit for small businesses).
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of law and the growth of a viable justice system. 102 Aid agencies
recognize the need to bring about economic growth and stability to
impoverished regions of the world in order to pave the way for
development policies that teach sustainability. For instance, a recent
USAID report stated:
Effective economic governance makes development possible. Growth
policies can be made to have the benefits reach the poor. But in most
developing countries the real challenge is achieving any kind of
sustainable growth and over the long term, a growing economy is required
to reduce poverty. At least for the next generation, U.S. efforts to reduce
poverty in developing countries must focus on promoting growth in
developing economies.
10 3
However, one must understand that a war on poverty -will fail if it
consists solely of aid money in the form of development grants and
emergency relief funds. 10 4 Critics of development aid in the Middle
East, for instance, argue that this type of aid is ineffective in Muslim
countries because of the failure of Arab governments to enact
policies that utilize the aid effectively. 05 Thus, poverty must be
102. See Pamela Constable, Tajikistan Struggles in Post-Soviet Poverty, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 2001, at A 14 (emphasizing the strong link between democracy and
economic welfare through an illustration of Tajikistan, a poverty-stricken nation
that is struggling to uphold its democratic government). As one policeman asked,
"Democracy is here, but without money how can we practice it?" Id.
103. See United States Agency for Int'l Dev., Foreign Aid in the National Inter-
est, ch. 2: Driving Economic Growth (2003) (suggesting that it may be easier for
developing countries to promote growth than it was for the United States because
the methods discovered and applied throughout American growth can be applied
and that U.S. instruction and assistance can promote growth in developing econo-
mies), at http://www.usaid.gov/fani/ch02/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
104. See Edwin Chen, Bush Proposes Major Boost in Development Aid, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A3 (stressing the importance of complimenting aid with
policy and reporting that President George W. Bush commented, "[w]hen nations
refuse to enact sound policies, progress against poverty is nearly impossible. In
these situations, more aid money can actually be counterproductive, because it
subsidizes bad policies, delays reform and crowds out private investment.").
105. See Francis Fukuyama, History and September 11, in WORLDS IN
COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 35, at 27, 33
(arguing that although opportunities for economic and political reform existed, the
governments of the Arab states were unwilling to accept such reformations and
that the aid not only was ineffective, but it also often times worsened the situation
as the money was spent on furthering Arab extremism).
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fought with an additional weapon in its arsenal-one that does not
yield so easily to political coercion, one that withstands changes in
government regimes, and one that provides opportunity to as many
people as possible.
B. ERADICATING TERROR WITH TRADE
International trade, when focused on human and market
development, is the most effective tool in preventing terrorism and
maintaining global stability. 10 6 By using concepts such as "tied aid"
to generate commerce in the interest of reducing poverty, developing
economies can address the primary social concerns of their people
while simultaneously improving their country's gross domestic
product ("GDP"). 107 In addition, the use of tax benefits to
transnational corporations and local assistance in development can
encourage transnational corporations to increase their involvement in
developing countries."0 8 The use of programs such as these will
strengthen the local and global economy and open pathways to
human and economic development.
In an attempt to generate commerce in the interest of reducing
poverty, nations turn to tied aid, which is defined as "monetary
assistance 'which is in effect (in law or fact) tied to the procurement
of goods and/or services from the donor country."' 1 9 The theory is
that a nation provides aid to a developing country under the
106. See Chen, supra note 104 (reporting that increased international trade will
likely reduce poverty and subsequently reduce terrorism, and relaying President
Bush's statement that "persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness
and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their peo-
ple, these failed states can become havens for terror.").
107. See Sheppard, supra note 54, at 97 (noting that nations can simultaneously
lessen poverty and enhance economic performance if they properly invest the aid
money).
108. See Antonio R. Zamora, Cuba's Business Enterprises: How Business in
Conducted on the Island, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 345, 356-57 (2003) (illustrating that
foreign investment in Cuba is growing as a result of local and international pro-
grams aimed at guiding investors through the process of foreign investment on the
heavily-sanctioned island).
109. See Sheppard, supra note 54, at 97 (explaining that the Export Credit Ar-
rangement, established in response to the fear that an oil crisis would "trigger an
export subsidy war," contained guidelines for tied aid in an effort to "encourage
competition among exporters" based upon quality and price).
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agreement that the funds will later be utilized "to purchase goods and
services from private exporters located in the donor country." 0 In
effect, this type of aid will allow the implementation of development
projects that address basic needs while at the same time creating a
future trade relationship with the donor country that ensures that the
aid serves as an investment rather than a donation.' In the hands of
aid agencies, tied aid can become an investment in the human
population that will yield returns not only in human capital, but also
through the subsequent import of the donor country's goods and
services.
However, government participation will not work if it is not
accompanied by a concerted effort on behalf of those private parties
involved in the commercial transactions." 2 Corporations must take
an active role in promoting and practicing sustainable trading
practices such that developing countries can maximize the growth
potential for their economies, provide employment to the local
population, and contribute to the development of human capital.
Corporations must also see the achievement of their investment goals
as dependent upon the development and education of the local
population, since they are the primary source of income for both the
local leadership and the workforce. Wise investments in training
programs have been shown to produce considerable and sustainable
results in several industries." 3
110. See id. at 97-98 (providing the rationale behind the use of tied aid, high-
lighting its shortcomings, and discussing the Reagan Administration's creation of a
"war chest" in an attempt to address such shortcomings).
111. See id. (outlining the benefits to both the grantor and the grantee of tied aid
as it helps the grantee develop a sustainable economy and it creates a new trade
relationship for the grantor).
112. See generally George T. Abed & Hamid R. Davoodi, International Mone-
tary Fund, Challenges of Growth and Globalization in the Middle East and North
Africa (2003) (identifying the gap left by foreign investors in the Middle East and
North Africa as a sign of failure to integrate into the world trading system and pro-
posing that reforming the public and private sector institutions "could result in a
20-fold increase in real per capita GDP"),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/abed.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2004).
113. See J.M. Migai Akech, The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Implica-
tions for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 651, 701-
02 (2001) (drawing upon the experience of the Asian Tigers to find that in order to
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Corporations frequently work with governments in order to secure
licenses, tax relief, or other benefits for their projects or exports.
Oftentimes, corporations directly or indirectly determine the
direction of growth in developing economies.' 1 4 However, we must
apply caution to the direct involvement of corporations because they
often work without the transparency required of government aid
agencies and thus may engage in morally questionable behavior that
will reflect poorly upon the overall project." 5 For instance, Talisman
Energy, a Canadian company, has been accused of working with the
government of Sudan, a suspected harborer of al Qaeda terrorists, to
"crack down on insurgents who threaten the daily production of
crude, or to clear oil areas of unwanted inhabitants" and build "roads
and airstrips that allowed government forces to pursue war."'" 6 Yet
while these corrupt practices shock the conscience of many corporate
responsibility advocates, even human rights attorneys within Sudan
have advocated for Talisman to stay since they provide significant
benefits to the ailing economy, initiate more open policies for
publicity and free speech, and help some locals live from day to
day." 7 The benefits of private sector involvement are undisputable,
take advantage of markets, exporters and transnational corporations must make
"massive investments in state capacity and human resource development").
114. See Derber, supra note 81, at 176 (claiming that corporations provide
governments with money in return for subsidies and tax breaks); see also BRIAN
GARDNER, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 11 (1971) (emphasizing the power and in-
fluence of the East India Company, which at its end, "was responsible, directly or
indirectly, for nearly one-fifth of the world's population").
115. See Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citi-
zen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 30 (2001) (emphasizing the need to ex-
amine which "corporations are involved in somehow undermining human dignity"
and to "place duties on them to prevent that sort of behavior"). One way to address
this need is to create a more transparent environment between human rights
groups, corporations, and governmental representatives. Id.
116. See Norimitsu Onishi, Oil Money Pulls Sudan Out of Its Location and To-
ward an Uncertain Future, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at A12 (discussing the di-
chotomy between the negative aspects of a corporation that colludes with the gov-
ernment to subdue those who would prevent profit and the positive aspects of a
country that depends on that corporation for production and growth as it can help
press for needed reforms).
117. See id. (reporting that a Sudanese human rights lawyer, expressing his sup-
port for Talisman, stated, "[t]hey are better than the Chinese... [t]he Chinese
don't care about human rights in Sudan. They don't have human rights in their
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but they must be accompanied by "best practices" policies that apply
transparency and corporate responsibility to their actions." I8
Energy corporations are routinely engaging in dialogue with
undemocratic government regimes in their bid for oil access. 19 In
these arrangements, corporations look the other way when
governments engage in violations of human rights, support terrorism,
or when corruption overruns the government and little or none of the
economic benefit is shared with the local population.2 0 This is
especially true in the Middle East where oil is rampant and
democracy is not. Capitalizing on the global dependence on oil,
"Arab leaders have come to realize that oil is the economic Achilles
heel of the industrialized democracies."'' A USAID official even
referred to countries rich in oil supplies as suffering from Dutch
Disease, where the focus on oil as a single export significantly
detracts from the development of their overall economy.' The
own country. We've met people from Talisman to talk about our concerns, but
we've never met any Malaysians or Chinese. They don't want to see us.")
118. See The World Bank Group, Company Codes of Conduct and International
Standards: An Analytical Comparison (reporting that a wide array of individuals
from stakeholders to the Secretary General of the United Nations called for more
transparency and accountability by corporations and that such corporations are ac-
countable to corporate best practices), at
http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/csr/doc/Company%20Codes%20of%/20C
onduct.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
119. See Tarek Ben Halim, Waging a 'Good War'for Arabs, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2003, at M5 (reporting that the United States depends on the Arab world for ac-
cess to cheap and reliable sources of oil despite the fact that "none of the Arab
governments are democratic or representative.").
120. See, e~g., Donald 0. Mayer, Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Account-
ability, and Sustainable Peace: Corporate Governance in the Cause of Peace: An
Environmental Perspective, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 601 (2002) (noting a
pattern amongst multi-national corporations to ignore human rights abuses made
by the governments with which they conduct business and claiming that Fidelity
Investments exemplified such a pattern when it possessed an eight percent stake in
a company that drilled for oil in sacred Indian lands, yet failed to ask the company
to abandon the project and preserve the land).
121. See id. at 635 (acknowledging that some Arab leaders "have proposed to
use oil as a weapon" and consequently questioning whether the Western World's
dependence on Middle East oil perpetuates the conflict between Islamic groups
and industrialized democracies).
122. See Emmy B. Simmons, Linking Trade and Sustainable Development:
Keynote Address, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1271, 1288-89 (2003) (explaining the
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severe dependence on oil by the West leads to their continued
involvement in the Middle East, thereby feeding the addict while
simultaneously winnowing alternative trades for the supplier.12 3
Furthermore, the Western involvement in the Middle East primarily
for the purpose of purchasing oil stimulates anti-Western sentiment
within radical or fundamentalist groups that recognize this one-track
purpose and the limited contribution it provides to true economic
growth within the region. A reduction in the number of Western
forces in the Middle East for purposes of protecting oil interests may,
in fact, contribute to an increase in peace between the East and the
West."'24 Speaking to the terrorist links to Saudi Arabia, the former
deputy assistant secretary of state for international energy policy
stated, "[t]he stark truth is that we're dependent on this country that
directly or indirectly finances people who are a direct threat to you
and me as individuals."'125
Military action against terrorist groups in the Middle East resulted
in an increased distaste for the United States not only in the Middle
East, but also throughout Europe. 2 6 And if the United States fails to
economic disease as an addiction to oil and gas, first coined when the Dutch dis-
covered natural gas in the North Sea and devoted significant resources to it which
resulted in the devaluation of manufactured products, despite the lack of continued
growth in revenue from the gas).
123. See id. at 1291 (identifying the problem that as a nation begins to export a
commodity such as oil, international creditors quickly respond and take the key
roles, leaving the less demanding jobs to the local employment and preventing the
local population from developing other trade options).
124. See Mayer, supra note 120, at 636-38 (noting that the U.S. dependence on
oil continuously provides a motive for military intervention, that such intervention
motivates the al-Qaeda network's attacks on the United States, and that "to the ex-
tent that consumers, corporations, and the U.S. government could, over time, re-
duce their collective reliance on Middle Eastern oil - or reduce their reliance on oil
generally -the prospects of peace may well be enhanced.").
125. See Neela Banerjee, The High, Hidden Cost of Saudi Arabian Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at 3 (arguing that American's dependence on Saudi Arabia
forced the Bush Administration to refrain from "criticizing Saudi silence over the
American-led counterattacks against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, nor has it
spoken out about evidence that Saudi citizens finance Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda
network and other radical Islamic organizations").
126. See, e.g., R.C. Longworth, When Rumsfield Speaks, Europe Bristles, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 16, 2003, at 17 (reporting that Europeans blame U.S. Defense Secre-
tary Rumsfeld for poor diplomacy and for attempting to "split Europeans into two
camps: those that support the U.S. and those that do not"); see also Philip H.
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address the reasons for this expanding hatred, it will once again
become the victim of its wrath. 7
V. THE BIG GUNS: MULTILATERALS AND THE
WTO
After the first Gulf war in 1991, the Senior Bush Administration
developed a "five-pillar" plan to prevent the circumstances that led to
that war from happening again. The third of these pillars focused on
economic development in the Middle East, specifically calling for "a
plan for economic reconstruction to ease tensions between the haves
and have-nots in the Arab world."' 8 The Senior Bush Administration
eventually abandoned this plan except for its intention to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.12 9 The failure of the Western nations to
bring a viable economic plan to the Middle East, where they were
Gordon, Bridging the Atlantic Divide, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 70 (high-
lighting the difference between Europe's pronouncement of "unlimited solidarity"
with the U.S. after Sept. 11 th and the present state in which "Europeans now regu-
larly accuse the United States of a simplistic approach to foreign policy that re-
duces everything to the military aspects of the war on terrorism.").
127. See Mayer, supra note 120, at 640 (arguing that military action in the Mid-
dle East will subdue terror attacks for a short period, but will not have any long-
term effect until the "roots of unrest are examined.").
128. See Baker Outlines Postwar Plans for Middle East, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at 3 (outlining President Bush Senior's five pillars as follows:
(1) a new security agreement in the region to stabilize the governments of Iraq and
Iran; (2) an arms control agreement to prevent Iraq from rebuilding chemical, bio-
logical or nuclear weapons; (3) a plan for economic reconstruction; (4) a renewed
effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and (5) a comprehensive strategy in
the U.S. to reduce dependence on foreign oil).
129. See Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in
WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER, supra note
35, at 172, 173 (pointing out that President Bush Senior, in response to Saddam
Hussein's act of conditioning Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait on Israel's with-
drawal from occupied Arab lands, indicated that "the U.S. would address the Arab-
Israeli conflict as soon as Iraq pulled out of or was booted out of Kuwait."). Of the
five pillars that President Bush Senior established, only the Arab-Israeli conflict
received substantive attention as the United States sponsored a peace process in
October 1991 with a focus on "security for Israel and justice for the Palestinians."
Id.
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already involved for their own benefit, revealed a sizable imbalance
in their placement of resources. 130
Governments and corporations, however, are not the only entities
that can assist in fighting terrorism with trade in the Middle East.
Many multi-lateral credit agencies, banks, and development
organizations have an important role to play in initiating growth and
bringing new investments into these regions.' 31
A. GROWTH THROUGH WORLD TRADE
The WTO is not a leading actor in most Middle Eastern countries.
The reasons for its limited involvement in the region are beyond the
scope of this essay. I will, however, attempt to proffer some reasons
why its increased involvement would be beneficial to world stability,
both socially and financially. As of the writing of this essay, seven
Middle Eastern countries (including Israel) have become members of
the WTO.13z The United States does not presently suspect these
countries of harboring terrorists.'33 However, Lebanon, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia, more conspicuous targets in the war on terrorism as of
130. See Mideast Turmoil: In Bush's Words: 'Break Free of Old Patterns', N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2002, at A14 (illustrating the inability of the West to provide the
Middle East with economic support as President George W. Bush stated, "[t]he
Middle East has often been left behind in the political and economic advancement
of the world.").
131. See Stephen Fidler, Multilateral Agencies Are Urged by U.S. Treasury to
Consider New Mechanisms for Delivering Emergency Finance, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1998, at 35 (advocating a review of whether multilateral banks have a role in
encouraging privately financed standby credits for countries).
132. See Ali & Partners, The Middle East and the World Trade Organization
(providing background information regarding Middle Eastern involvement in the
WTO including the following dates of accession: Kuwait (Jan. 1, 1995), Bahrain
(Jan. 1, 1995), Egypt (June 30, 1995), Qatar (Jan. 13, 1996) and the United Arab
Emirates (Apr. 10, 1996)), at
http://www.mideastlaw.com/MiddleEast and the worldtrade_.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004); see also World Trade Org., Members and Observers, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2004).
133. See Gerry J. Gilmore, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Join High-Threat Areas, AM.
FOREIGN PRESS SERV., Oct. 31, 2000 (noting that the bombing of the USS Cole
took place off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000 and the United States
added Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the list of high-risk security threats due to in-
creased terrorist activity at the time).
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late, have begun the process of seeking WTO membership.'34 But,
the process is long and often difficult for developing countries. The
recent accession of Jordan to the WTO was achieved in 2000, with
significant help from the United States,'35 after six years of
negotiations. 3 6 Dr. M. Halaiqah, the chief negotiator from Jordan,
summed up the achievement concisely, "[t]his is truly a historical
moment for Jordan, as we have long aspired to become a member of
the WTO. ' ' 137
Complete WTO accession may not be the solution to our
immediate security concerns.' 38 Former U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky said:
[W]e need programs of a more immediate nature because it is critical to
bring economic and job growth to this region to provide hope and a
counterweight to a large growing, relatively well-educated but
unemployed population, subject, of course, as well to radical ideology. So
we need much more immediate relief. And we need the kind of relief that
may help these countries integrate one with the other.
139
134. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Jordan Becomes 136th Member of
the WTO (Apr. 11, 2000) (discussing the recent accession of Jordan to the WTO
and positioning the region as ripe for WTO membership), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/presOOe/prl74-e.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2004).
135. See Analysis: U.S.-Middle East Free Trade Zone (Nat'l. Pub. Radio broad-
cast, June 3, 2003) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast] (explaining that the United States
created a duty free program for Jordanian-Israeli goods to enter the United States
and also negotiated a free trade agreement with Jordan to assist with WTO acces-
sion), at http://www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2003/jun/030603.barsh.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
136. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Jordan Becomes 136" Member of the
WTO (Apr. 11, 2000) (reporting that Jordan became a member of the WTO in
2000 after first establishing a working party under the GATT in Jan. 1994)
137. Id.
138. See NPR Broadcast, supra note 135 (suggesting that the goal of political
stability in the region is tied to sustainable economic growth, but that current pro-
posals for free trade will not go into effect for at least ten years).
139. See id.
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This is not to say that the WTO is not interested in securing the
membership of developing countries. 141 In fact, through the use of
programs designed to bring developing countries up to speed with
the developed market structure employed by the majority of the
world, including structural adjustment policies and trade without
preferences, the WTO is sending a message to the developing world
that working with the WTO will provide both protection and
prosperity for their citizens and their markets. 141
Yet despite this availability of WTO programs for both short and
long term economic development, many Middle Eastern countries
hesitate to join the world body. 42 One reason for their reluctance
may be their inherent resistance to market colonization, the preferred
method of global economic integration. As New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman explains, "[1]ike all other revolutions,
globalization involves a shift in power from one group to another.'
'1 43
This shift in power results in the relocation of power centers from
government offices and agencies to private sector industries and
independent minds. 44 This creates both an external colonization of
the market system as a whole, and an internal colonization of the
political and social structure, achieved primarily through independent
power brokering between foreign investors and local businesspeople.
The result is a frightening state of affairs that promises, without
guaranteeing anything, to try to achieve economic and social
equality. It is indeed a significant risk for a country unexposed to the
140. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? In-
ternational Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal,
Globalized Civilization, 35 TEX. INT'L L. J. 387, 408 (2000) (inferring that the
WTO is interested in membership of developing nations as a way to push standards
for globalization and to promote standards for how they should deal with property
and capital).
141. See Akech, supra note 113, at 653 (arguing that despite any benefit to
developing countries, Western countries stand to benefit more from freer trade).
142. See Lindsey, supra note 70 (contending that as a result of self imposed iso-
lation from the global economy, many Muslim nations, including Iran, Iraq, Leba-
non, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, are not qualified to join the WTO).
143. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 336 (Anchor Books
2000).
144. See id. at 336-37 (explaining how business owners in communist and so-
cialist systems have also lost power because they are no longer protected or se-
cured by their ties with the government).
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regular risks of a market economy, but it is one that must be taken if
they intend to embark on a growth and development action plan.
The speed of globalization is increasing and more countries, to
their own benefit or detriment, are opening their markets and
increasing transnational business.'45 However, the recent surge in
terrorist activities from the Middle East has led some Western
nations, the United States in particular, to focus on the economic,
social, and political structures of countries in the region.4 6 Although
this has not yet been the result and seems to be a long way off, the
forced regime change in Iraq, for instance, intends to lay the
foundation for a stable and democratic government that will meld
with a global economy.
While the Pentagon calls for 100,000 troops to remain in post-war
Iraq to achieve stability, the WTO offers a solution that requires the
adoption of rule of law programs and far fewer troops. 147 For
instance, membership in the WTO requires governments to adhere to
policies adverse to protectionism in order to benefit both domestic
and international markets. 48 If a country decides to institute quotas
or to take some other protective measure, the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") will publicly bring it to bear for the deleterious effect
that their action has on the global economy. 49 Within a smooth-
operating system such as this, market stability, as well as government
behavior that affects markets, becomes transparent and accessible to
145. See id. at 9 (noting that the percentage of countries worldwide with liberal
economic free market regimes rose from eight percent in 1975 to twenty-eight per-
cent in 1997).
146. See Call For Free Trade, supra note 79 (referring to the Middle East part-
nership initiative in which the United States and Middle Eastern regional leaders
are working together to institute economic, political and social reforms).
147. See generally Dave Moniz, Ex-Army Boss: Pentagon Won't Admit Reality
in Iraq, USA TODAY, June 3, 2003, at Al (observing that Defense Secretary Rums-
feld was not specific about the size of the force needed in post-war Iraq and that
the Pentagon hoped the number of troops would be quickly decreased).
148. See World Trade Org., 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System, 5-8 [here-
inafter 10 Benefits] (summarizing how free trade results in lower prices of goods, a
lower cost of living, higher incomes, and greater consumer choice), at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/doloade/10b-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
149. See id. at 3 (claiming that the existence and use of this body serves to miti-
gate potentially more serious political conflicts between countries).
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the public. 5 ' In addition, membership in the WTO assures
developing countries that they will have a voice in trade negotiations,
structural assistance, global market reform, and product
diversification within their own economies 5 - a positive change for
a region with so much more than oil to contribute to international
trade.
Under the 100,000 troop method, the United States cannot
guarantee stability for any long period of time, and the likelihood of
distaste for a long-term foreign physical presence within the country
is greatly increased. Jobs are not typically created in target countries
through conventional warfare strategies, but they will be created if
trade and the WTO are used as instruments of development and
liberation.'52
B. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE MEFTA
Some regional efforts exist in the Middle East to establish trade
unions and prepare for the development of viable global market
economies that will accelerate compliance with international
standards and foster entry into the world market.'53 For instance, the
Maghreb countries'54 established the Arab Maghreb Union ("AMU")
in 1989 to discern solutions to their rapidly increasing debt.'55
Notably, these members did not include Iraq or Iran. The member
countries sought to implement a customs union and common market
in the years following its inception, but neither was achieved, partly,
150. See id. (discussing how WTO judgments provide guidance for future be-
havior of member countries).
151. See id. at 4 (explaining that smaller countries enjoy increased bargaining
power because they have an equal voice in negotiating WTO agreements and equal
rights to challenge trade practices of larger nations).
152. See id. at 9 (advocating that free trade is responsible for a 300,000 -
900,000 increase in jobs in the E.U.).
153. See BEVERLY M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 288 (2001) (noting, however, that the Middle East remains one of the
least integrated trade regions worldwide).
154. See id. at 290 (listing the Maghreb countries as: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, and Tunisia).
155. See id. (observing that as of 1992, the Maghreb countries had a combined
external debt of $65 billion, or fifty-seven percent of their combined GDP).
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critics claim, due to the group's "swift acceptance of so many trade
agreements." 15
6
Several countries joined to establish the European-Mediterranean
Economic Area ("EMEA") in 1995 to improve the already
significant amount of trade between the two regions) 5' Fifteen
European countries and twelve Mediterranean countries became
members of the EMEA, none of which included Iraq or Iran. 58 The
European Union's stated goal of this relationship was to make the
North-South relationship as strong as Europe's thriving East-West
relationship through the use of education and infrastructure
projects. 5 9 The EMEA is a highly successful union that may be the
staging ground for full cooperation between Europe and the Middle
East, but not necessarily for the remainder of the global
marketplace. 160
More recently, and perhaps most importantly for the war on terror,
is the effort on behalf of the United States to develop the MEFTA. At
a recent multilateral summit in Egypt, President Bush pushed
"nations throughout the region to open their markets, to seek broader
trade in the world and to join us in creating a U.S.-Middle East free
trade area within a decade."'' President Bush spoke more about this
156. See id. at 290-91 (indicating that political dissention among member coun-
tries has also contributed to the AMU's limited success).
157. See id. at 294 (explaining that the agreement seeks to establish a free trade
zone, with the exception of agricultural products, by 2010).
158. See Carl, supra note 153, at 294 (stating that the member states from the
Mediterranean include Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel,. Lebanon, Malta,
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey).
159. See id. at 295 (remarking that the European Union offered the assistance
after Mediterranean countries complained that the European Union favored Eastern
and Central European countries).
160. See id. at 296 (suggesting that global inclusion into the union may prove
difficult because it consists of a series of bilateral agreements between the Euro-
pean Union and individual Mediterranean states rather than a single joint agree-
ment between all of the parties).
161. Matthew Gutman, At Sharm, Bush Reinforces Commitment to End Terror,
JERUSALEM POST, June 4, 2003, at 1; see also NPR Broadcast, supra note 135 (ex-
plaining that U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky discussed on a panel
that the implementation of a Free Trade Area in the Middle East should not be ex-
pected to take root immediately, but can be expected to come over a ten-year
span).
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initiative at the commencement speech at the University of South
Carolina. 6 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell followed-up on this
initiative in a January 2004 New York Times editorial, where he
stated that President Bush's "proposal to develop a Middle East free
trade agreement is high on the agenda.'
'1 63
Among the initiatives highlighted by President Bush during his
speech were the establishment of a Middle East Free Trade Area
within ten years, reform efforts to prime countries in the region for
WTO membership, trade capacity building for integration into the
global trading system, reform of commercial and judicial codes, and
improved transparency to fight corruption. 164 Among the initiatives
with more immediate effect are the launching of new bilateral free
trade agreements, completion of trade negotiations with Morocco by
the end of 2003, the initiation of programs to train women, media
professionals, and parliamentarians, and the establishment of a
Middle East finance facility to assist small and medium business
owners and developers. 65 No one can dispute that within each of
these long and short-term goals an American ideology is woven into
the fabric of the administration's efforts. However, as negotiations
have yet to begin with the countries themselves, we may presume
that their lofty and often diverse goals will stimulate a balancing act
among the countries involved in the agreement.
The present approach of the United States is to negotiate
individual free trade agreements with peaceful, terrorism-free Middle
Eastern countries, and then to coalesce them into a single free trade
area. 66 The problem with this approach is that it creates an
162. See Call for Free Trade, supra note 79 (proposing the free trade agreement
to "provid[e] hope for people who live in that region").
163. Colin L. Powell, What We Will Do in 2004, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at
A25.
164. See Call for Free Trade, supra note 79 (asserting that the people of the
Middle East will enjoy prosperity and freedom if free markets and fair laws are in
place).
165. See id. (explaining that the purpose of these initiatives is to expand oppor-
tunity and re-ignite economic growth in the Middle East).
166. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
(summarizing development of the trade agreement between the United States and
Morocco to possibly be concluded in 2004), at http://www.buyusa.gov/morocco/
en/page33.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
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imbalance among countries in the region that often compete for the
export of the same products. 167
Brink Lindsey, the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies
at the Cato Institute, published a report explaining how to fight
terrorism with trade. 168 The paper emphasizes the importance of how
the MEFTA is drafted and how broad in scope it will be. In this
regard, he argues for the immediate need to remove trade barriers on
products, other than petroleum, that countries in the region excel at
producing.1 69 "Leading the world toward closer commercial ties can
reduce threats to American interests and security by calming fears
and resentment of American power."'170
Yet despite these positive efforts on the part of the Bush
administration, it readily admits that it is not pursuing increased trade
as a viable alternative to conventional military action to pursue the
purveyors of terrorism. National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza
Rice described the Middle East trade initiative as a promise of hope,
stating that "[i]t's not that trade makes peace, but it is that prosperity
and trade give people hope. It gives them a desire for a better life. It
allows them to concentrate on the things that all people are
concerned about: better life for their children, opportunities for their
children."''
State, U.S. and Bahrain to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (announcing plans be-
tween the United States and Bahrain to negotiate a free trade agreement), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/text2003/0521 freetrade.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 20, 2004).
167. See Larry Luxner, U.S. to Fight Terrorism with Trade, THE MIDDLE EAST,
Nov. 1, 2003, at 38 (indicating that "[s]ince competitiveness in exporting a particu-
lar product to the [United States] is often shared by a number of Muslim countries,
granting duty-free treatment to one country through an FTA would likely inflict
harm on other exporters in the region.").
168. See Lindsey, supra note 70 (indicating that new trade initiatives with the
Middle East aim to combat terrorism by promoting economic and political devel-
opment in the region).
169. See id. at 9 (contending that freer trade will open up competition in agricul-
ture and manufacturing, resulting in lower costs of service and an increase in for-
eign investment).
170. Id. at 12.
171. NPR Broadcast, supra note 135.
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The involvement of the entire Middle East in bodies such as the
WTO will allow the region to quickly reap significant economic and
non-economic benefits for their citizens.'72 Some of these economic
benefits include reduced tariff rates, protection from dumping by
other countries, and diversification and development of their
economies.'73 Some non-economic benefits of WTO membership
include access to the DSB, the capacity building programs, a plethora
of new markets, and development of the rule of law. 74 Also, through
the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") of the WTO
accession process, developing countries are protected from the early
challenges of equal competition for a period of ten years by
assuming lower customs duties for their exports to developed
countries. 75
The responsibility to attack terrorism at its roots by striking at the
wealth disparity, unemployment, and in many cases, desperation
found in developing countries, falls into the hands of wealthy
nations. 7 6 In a post-September 11 th speech, former President Bill
Clinton commented that wealthy nations bear the responsibility of
172. See generally Bernard Hoekman & Patrick Messerlin, Harnessing Trade
for Development and Growth in the Middle East (2002) (recommending that
MENA countries use the WTO as a means for domestic reforms),
http://www3.cfr.org/pdf/MENA1.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
173. See generally World Trade Org., The WTO in Brief (discussing the key eco-
nomic benefits WTO negotiations have brought to its member countries), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/inbriefe/inbrOOe.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2004).
174. See 10 Benefits, supra note 148 (exploring ten reasons to support the WTO,
including, inter alia, the system promotes peace; disputes are handled construc-
tively; trade raises incomes; and trade stimulates economic government); see also
World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO 55-61(2003) [hereinafter Understand-
ing the WTO] (explaining the process by which member countries of the WTO
bring suits before the DSB), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/understanding._e.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2004).
175. See Understanding the WTO, supra note 174, at 93-96 (explaining the
benefits of WTO membership for developing countries, including the GSP, also
extra time to fulfill their commitments, legal advice, and training seminars and
workshops for their officials).
176. See Dimbleby Lecture, supra note 50 (urging that in order to stop future
terrorist attacks, the wealthy countries must spread the benefits of the twenty first
century, specifically: the global economy, the information technology revolution,
advances in science, and the explosion of democracy).
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ensuring a world with, more partners and fewer terrorists and
potential terrorists. 177
C. GROWTH THROUGH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Will increased trade make poor, developing countries less
vulnerable to terrorism? Latin America, Asia, and Africa have
welcomed and encouraged trade in their developing countries,
seeking increased foreign investment to stimulate the growth of their
economies. In many instances, however, investment has not created
the anticipated growth it promised, and in some instances it has even
widened the gap between the rich and the poor, creating tension
among the populace. Yet the dissenters are primarily dismayed by
the failing domestic economic policies, which they blame
globalization for, rather than citing their lack of access to new
markets.'78 This is symbolic of the need for coordinated efforts not
only to bring markets to people, but to bring people to markets by
educating local businesspeople and policymakers, fostering
transparency in government, and requiring investors to take a leading
role in the communities in which they choose to invest.
Foreign direct investment ("FDI") in the Middle East has been
sporadic at best. Recent estimates suggest that the region receives
only one-third of the amount of investment received by other
developing countries. 17 9 It is critical that new sectors are developed
in the region to diversify its .market share and create job growth. This
goal can be achieved through direct investment, and the investors can
then be seen as partners in the war on terror. 8'
177. See id. (arguing it is not enough to "defeat the terrorist," but that the
wealthy nations must also shrink the burden of global poverty facing poorer coun-
tries).
178. See Fukuyama, supra note 105, at 33 (observing that the underlying prob-
lem in the Muslim world is "a political one in the Muslim world itself," as no sin-
gle oil-rich state in the Persian Gulf "has used its wealth to create a self-sustaining
industrial society").
179. See Abed, supra note 112 (noting further that most of the foreign direct in-
vestment the region does receive is concentrated in a minority of countries).
180. See Lindsey, supra note 70, at 1 (praising the Bush Administration for us-
ing trade and direct investment in the Middle East as a front in the war on terror-
ism).
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In addition to FDI, Multi-National Corporations ("MNCs") also
have a substantial role to play in fighting terrorism.' Second to the
military, MNCs are the most widely recognized symbols of the West
in the Middle East. 8 2 Whether this presence stimulates visions of
anger and hatred or of peace and stability is largely dependent upon
the role the MNC plays within a particular country.'83 Coordination
with local governments to bring investment, employment, and
ecologically-sound projects to the country will reflect highly upon
the local population, creating positive relationships with the
corporation, and reducing the possibility of retaliation against its
presence. 8 4
CONCLUDING REMARKS
ON ENGAGING THE ENEMY
Exporting a multitude of McDonald's franchises to the Middle
East is not the answer to the problems presented in this essay.
Furthermore, a broad increase in FDI alone is not the type of change
in trade that will result in sustainable development and a reduction in
terrorist activity. It is very important that we consider the type of
trade that would be most beneficial to these Middle Eastern
countries. This includes trade that will go beyond the mere export of
textiles and raw materials-it is trade that will have a direct effect on
the local economy."15
181. See, e.g., Roni N. Halabi, Stability in the Middle East Through Economic
Development: An Analysis of the Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade,
Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 275, 282 (1997)
(stating that "[floreign private investment is critical to the stability in the [Middle
East] region, not only because it creates jobs, but it also creates a stronger tax base,
increases trade, and thereby raises the overall standard of living of the inhabitants
of the region.").
182. See Fukuyama, supra note 105, at 31 (noting that Islamic fundamentalists,
like Osama bin Laden, view Western consumerism as evidence of Western deca-
dence).
183. See Mayer, supra note 120, at 652 (arguing that when the world's largest
MNCs fail to "address negative externalities and perverse subsidies," they are not
participating "in a system of global free trade that is sustainable.").
184. See Mayer, supra note 120, at 652 (referring to such a policy as an ethical
duty, and one that is "eminently practical").
185. See Akech, supra note 113, at 700 (comparing FDI in supermarkets or fast
food chains with FDI in manufactured products for export, including steel, car
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Increased trade, through the development of successful and stable
global market economies, benefits the local population when it
creates jobs, improves educational and/or job-training opportunities
and merges with the local culture. FDI in local projects, joint
ventures,1 16  multi-lateral financial support for infrastructure
development, and job-training by international aid agencies would
have a significant positive impact on local communities because it
would cultivate lasting growth even after the completion of the
particular project(s).
The war on terrorism will be more successful if it involves trading
partners in the regions in which terrorism is most likely to flourish.
Swift market development, support of local business sector
development through FDI, and substantial efforts to implement rule
of law programs will undoubtedly achieve the goals in the war on
terror more quickly and completely than brute force. A partnership
between the West and countries throughout the Middle East will
raise the overall GDP, improve human health and education, prevent
diseases which often have a global impact, and serve to counter the
root causes of terrorism. 187
Recent efforts to prevent terrorist attacks through preemptive
strikes raise not only serious civil and human rights issues, but also
critical economic concerns. Military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
parts, or computer components, and concluding the latter will raise growth more
than the former).
186. See, e.g., Christopher Frank, Turkey's Admittance to the European Union:
A Keystone Between Continents, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 66, 71 (2002)
("Joint ventures are perfect mechanisms to create cooperation and increase foreign
investment between the EU and the Middle East. They are ideal methods of in-
vestment in the Middle East because they minimize the risks and disadvantages
while maximizing the positive aspects of the region.").
187. See Hunter R. Clark, African "Renaissance" and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 271 (1999) (using Africa as an example of how foreign
investment and trade not only led to internal stability, but also benefited the United
States by creating a new partner with whom it can "tackle common challenges"
such as drugs, disease, and the environment); see also Lindsey, supra note 70, at
13 (arguing that the Bush Administration should avoid using trade policy as re-
taliation against countries that have "crossed" the United States, and instead should
view U. S. trade policy as an "olive branch to the world. By opening our markets
to the rest of the world whether unilaterally or in concert with other nations - we
demonstrate that America's interest lies, not in keeping other countries down, but
in encouraging them to rise and prosper.").
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as well as the identification of countries in other regions as targets in
the war on terror, have led many investors to flee to safer havens.'88
The economic consequence of these investment withdrawals has
been the stunting of the nascent growth in the region.'89 It is just
these types of investment climates that, when accompanied by
increased political stability and the development of a rule of law
system, will allow for growth in the region. And it is just this type of
growth that will reduce the influence that terrorist recruiters such as
Osama bin Laden have on the populace.
Will significant economic growth and political stability eliminate
the possibility of terrorist activity? The answer is no. Terrorist ideas
fester in developing and developed countries and among both rich
and poor populations. The aim of preventing terrorist attacks in the
Middle East is to reduce the likelihood that terrorism will become a
viable form of political expression amidst a weak government, or
worse still, that terrorism will become the rule, rather than the
exception, to everyday governance. Dropping an arsenal of bombs on
these countries, changing their leadership to our liking, and
attempting to create lasting stability through shows of force misses
the mark in fighting the intended target. War does not create lasting
jobs, reduce poverty, or make terrorist activity less appealing to the
citizens in the country being attacked. However, the world has
another, much more powerful weapon in its arsenal that will be
eminently more successful in winning this "war" - trade. It is only
here that the real enemy will be defeated, and the real war won.
The MEFTA is a step in the right direction. Arab countries must
now rise up and take a leading role in developing these initiatives,
since it is they who will benefit most in both the short and long
terms. WTO accession is a long and often difficult process, one that
requires governments to make adjustments that could meet with
188. See Ma. Elizabeth L. Sanchez, Yearend Report: Security Beyond Anything;
Meeting Global Standards vs. Money Laundering, Bus. WORLD, Jan. 7, 2003, at 30
(quoting Simon R. Paterno, President of the Philippines Development Bank: "It is
difficult to pull out of a slowdown when investment isn't being made and no one
wants to commit large investments to increase capacity for new projects because of
the specter of terrorist troubles and of war in the Middle East so that affects the
economy in general.").
189. See Mayer, supra note 120, at 651 (arguing in favor of long-term develop-
ment, stating that temporary development will bring "renewed human misery").
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serious resistance in their leadership and among their citizens. But
the long and challenging road will result in improvements in the
GDP, education, per capita earnings, employment and opportunities
for market development.
States must enact these long-term efforts alongside short-term
development goals, including the immediate restructuring of
financial policy, a drastic reduction of government subsidies on
imports, and the implementation of the rule of law. These goals can
be achieved through assistance provided by investments from
multilateral agencies and foreign investors, direct aid from
development organizations such as USAID and CIDA, and tied aid
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Export-Import Bank. The West should indeed have a significant
presence in the Middle East today, but not a military presence.
Rather, their presence should be in the form of advisors and
investors, contractors and aid workers, and community leaders and
activists. The image of the West as colonizers must be traded for the
image of the West as partners in development. There is indeed
money to be made in the Middle East, but more importantly, there
are lives to be given new meaning through employment, improved
healthcare, and opportunities for growth.
In this essay I attempted to highlight some of the ways in which
the West is failing in its "war on terror" by identifying poverty,
unemployment, and a lack of opportunity as the root causes for the
development and propagation of terrorism.190 I explained how the
weak governments and the weak links between international trade
organizations and the Middle East region contributed to incomplete
development in the region.1 91 Finally, I offered some modest
suggestions for adjusting our strategy to bring about a reduction in
terrorist attacks, growth and development for the lives of Middle
Easterners, and beneficial trading partners for foreign investors and
Middle Eastern domestic concerns.i92 I hope that approval and
190. See supra Part I (observing that terrorism is both political expression and
expression of despair for a better way of life).
191. See supra Part IV (discussing the important role multi-lateral organizations
can play in brining investment into the Middle East region).
192. See supra Part IV (arguing in favor of increased FDI into the region and
accession to the WTO by Middle Eastern countries).
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implementation of the MEFTA, increased FDI, and more use of tied
aid to support growth in the region will occur in the coming months.
It has been, and will continue to be my intention to find ways in
which people living in the Middle East can acquire opportunities
such that they will never have the need or desire to resort to
terrorism.
